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The Jurisdictional Reach of a Federal Court Hearing a
Federal Cause of Action: A Path Through the Maze
David E. Seidelson*
To what extent may a federal court hearing a federal cause of
action assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant? The an-
swer to that very basic question is anything but clear and simple.
Concepts of jurisdiction and venue often become blurred;' congres-
sional grants of jurisdiction and procedural modes of service some-
times seem at odds.2 The procedural rules regulating the manner
of service can themselves generate confusion between exclusively
federal methods of service and those state methods which may (or
may not) be used in federal causes of action.3 Indeed, there is some
question as to which modes of service, admittedly applicable to
federal causes of action, may be used to effect extraterritorial ser-
vice.' Ultimately, there is the constitutional inhibition on jurisdic-
tion over nonresidents: due process.5 What's a poor lawyer (or
judge) to do? I wish I could say that the answers had come to me
* Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. See infra text accompanying note 38 & note 39.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 11-12.
3. See infra text accompanying note 21 & note 22.
4. See text accompanying notes 17-56.
5. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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in a startling revelation (perhaps the product of divine interven-
tion) akin to a bolt of lightning on a pitch-black night. They did
not. Apparently, that dramatic form of manifestation remains re-
served for Gary Cooper portraying a Sergeant York. I have stum-
bled and tripped and fallen and arisen and stumbled again trying
to get through the maze. Finally, aided in part by recent congres-
sional amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" and in
part by a recently enacted jurisdictional statute,7 I have arrived at
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i) and (ii); 4(f).
7. Federal Courts Improvement Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1631 (West Supp. 1983):
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court ... and that court finds that there is a
want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such
action. . . to any other court in which the action. . . could have been brought at the
time it was filed . . . and the action. . . shall proceed as if it had been filed in...
the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in...
the court from which it is transferred.
Id. The language of the statute would seem to be broad enough to encompass either a want
of personal jurisdiction or a want of subject matter jurisdiction. There is language in the
legislative history, however, that implies that the act may have been intended to apply only
to a want of subject matter jurisdiction:
Because of the complexity of the Federal court system and of special jurisdictional
provisions, a civil case may on occasion be mistakenly filed in a court-either trial or
appellate-that does not have jurisdiction. By the time the error is discovered, the
statute of limitations or a filing period may have expired. Moreover, additional ex-
pense is occasioned by having to file the case anew in the proper court.
[This section] . . . would authorize the court in which a case is improperly filed to
transfer it to a court where subject matter jurisdiction is proper. The case would be
treated by the transferee court as though it had been initially filed there on the date
on which it was filed in the transferor court. The plaintiff will not have to pay any
additional filing fees. This provision is broadly drafted to allow transfer between any
two Federal courts. Although most problems of misfiling have occurred in the district
and circuit courts, others have occurred in the Court of International Trade and the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. Some others may occur in the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit. The broadly drafted provision of [this section] will help
avoid all of these situations.
S. Rep. No. 97-180, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 40 (italics added).
The italicized phrase seems somewhat ambiguous. Does it mean that the statute applies
only to a want of subject matter jurisdiction? Or does the statute apply to a want of either
personal or subject matter jurisdiction, with the italicized phrase being an admonition to the
transferor court to assure that any intended transferee court be one which would have sub-
ject matter jurisdiction? If the latter interpretation is correct, the statute serves as rather
direct and persuasive evidence that Congress is not significantly offended by the bringing of
an action in a court which lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant; transfer rather
than dismissal is hardly the prescription to deal with a serious affront to congressional au-
thority. If the former interpretation is intended, the statute still serves as some evidence
that Congress would not be significantly offended by the bringing of an action in a court
lacking personal jurisdiction over the defendant. After all, a want of personal jurisdiction is
waivable by the defendant; a want of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by either
or both parties. If transfer rather than dismissal is the preferred congressional reaction to a
want of subject matter jurisdiction, it seems unlikely that Congress would insist on dismissal
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certain conclusions which may be of assistance to the reader and
which may suggest resolutions of some of the more difficult
problems. At the very least, the conclusions point toward a logical
symmetry in determining the jurisdictional reach available to a
federal court hearing a federal cause of action.
There seems to be a consensus that, had it wished, Congress
could have explicitly given federal courts hearing all federal causes
of action nationwide jurisdiction.' It didn't. Instead, Congress has
explicitly afforded nationwide jurisdiction only sparingly;9 in gen-
given a want of personal jurisdiction only. Both the statute and the Senate Report seem
aimed at securing a prompt judicial resolution of the merits of the case.
8. See, e.g., Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) ("Con-
gress could provide for service of process anywhere in the United States."). See also Gilbert
v. Bagley, 492 F.Supp. 714 (M.D.N.C. 1980):
Rule 4(f) ...recognizes the power of Congress to provide for nationwide service of
process to enforce a federal right. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S.
438. . .(1946). Congress' authority rests upon the fundamental right of a sovereign
to exercise jurisdiction over any defendant within its territory.
Id. at 746.
See also Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts - Suggestions for
Reform, 7 VAND. L. REv. 608 (1954):
In prescribing the rules governing the place of trial of actions commenced in the
federal district courts, Congress might reasonably have been expected to follow one of
two courses. On the one hand, it might have treated the continental United States as
a single jurisdiction. On this basis service of process would have been permitted
throughout the United States, venue rules would have been designated to channel
litigation into the most convenient district, and provisions would have been made for
a motion for change of venue to be granted whenever the suit was commenced in a
district which did not have venue. On the other hand, Congress might have treated
the individual federal districts as independent states. On this basis service of process
would have been restricted to the district in which suit was brought, but venue of
transitory actions would have been made proper in any district in which the defen-
dant could be found for service of process. In fact, of course, Congress ... adopted
neither of these alternatives. Instead, it . . .limited venue to the residence of all the
defendants or, in diversity cases, all the plaintiffs while at the same time confining
service of process to the boundaries of the state in which the district court is located.
Id. at 608. Of course, Professor Barrett's description of the path selected by Congress re-
flects the date of his excellent article.
See also United States v. Hill, 694 F.2d 258, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citations omitted)
("Congress, of course, could authorize suits under federal law in any inferior federal tribunal
...and provide that the process of every district court shall run into every part of the
United States ....").
9. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1976):
In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader . . . a district
court may issue its process for all claimants and enter its order restraining them from
instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United States court affect-
ing the property, instrument or obligation involved in the interpleader action until
further order of the court. Such process and order . . . shall be addressed to and
served by the United States marshals for the respective districts where the claimants
reside or may be found.
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eral, no such explicit jurisdictional reach has been granted. There
also seems to be a consensus that the jurisdictional reach of a fed-
eral court hearing a federal cause of action can go no further than
Congress provides."e Consequently, the problem of jurisdiction
over a defendant not residing within the state in which the federal
court sits would arise only in those actions in which Congress has
in some manner authorized some degree of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
Let's begin by assuming, then, that Congress has afforded some
extraterritorial jurisdiction as to a given federal cause of action.
How is service of process to be effected? If the jurisdictional stat-
ute sets forth the mode of service to be utilized, of course that
manner of service may be used." If the jurisdictional statute does
not prescribe a method of service, recourse may be had to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.
12
Rule 4(d)(1) provides that service may be made on a competent
adult
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally
or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent author-
ized by appointment or by law to receive service of process."
Service on "a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partner-
ship or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit
Such district court shall hear and determine the case, and may discharge the plain-
tiff from further liability, make the injunction permanent, and make all appropriate
orders to enforce its judgment.
Id.
10. See United States v. Hill, 694 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1982):
[W]here Congress has not [provided that the process of every district shall run into
every part of the United States], Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
normally confines the geographical area in which a court's process can be served to
"the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held," FED. R. Civ. P.
4(f); service outside the state is permitted only "when authorized by a statute of the
United States" or by some other specific provision of the Federal Rules, id.; see Mis-
sissippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-46 . . . (1946).
Id. at 261.
11. "Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides
for service of a summons ... upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in
which the district court is held, service may be made under the circumstances and in the
manner prescribed by the statute or order. ... FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
12. The Federal Rules provide that "if there is no provision [in the statute or order of
court thereunder] prescribing the manner of service, [service may be made] in a manner
stated in this rule." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
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under a common name"'14 may, according to 4(d)(3), be effected
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a
managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appoint-
ment or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one author-
ized by statute to receive service and the statute requires, by also mailing a
copy to the defendant. 6
Moreover, if the defendant is a competent adult or one of the other
suable entities named above, recently enacted 4(c)(2)(C) provides
that service may be effected
(i) pursuant to the law of the State in which the district court is held for the
service of summons or other like process upon such defendant in an action
brought in the court of general jurisdiction of that state, or (ii) by mailing a
copy of the summons and of the complaint (by first-class mail, postage pre-
paid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of a notice and
acknowledgement. . . and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to
the sender. If no acknowledgement of service . . . is received within 20 days
after the date of mailing, service of such summons and complaint shall be
made [by any person who is not a party and is not less than 18 years of age,
or by a United States marshal or deputy United States marshal, or by a
person specially appointed by the Court for that purpose.] 6
Well, all of that certainly seems accommodating enough. One could
hardly wish for a broader selection of modes of service. As for who
is to carry out the mechanics of effecting service, one could not
imagine a more encompassing selection than (1) any person desig-
nated by the law of the forum state, (2) plaintiff or plaintiff's coun-
sel, if mail service is utilized, or (3) any adult nonparty, a United
States marshal or deputy marshal, or anyone appointed by the
court. The class of persons who may effect service seems to be at
least as broad as the modes of service available. Talk about accom-
modating. Why, all the plaintiff has to do is have someone in that
broad class effect service on the defendant in any of the several
methods available. What could be easier? And what's the problem?
Well, the first problem is where may such service be effected?
Do the rules set forth above apply to service of process effected
outside the forum state as well as within? Or do the rules set forth
above-4(d)(1), 4(d)(3), and 4(c)(2)(C)-simply define the me-
chanics and those competent to effect the mechanics of service
within the state in which the federal court sits? The headings of
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
15. Id.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i) & (ii). The bracketed language in the text is incorpo-
rated in the rule by reference to FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(A) & (B).
1985
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Rule 4(e) 1 -7 Summons: Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or
Found Within State-and Rule 4(f) -Territorial Limits of Effec-
tive Service-would suggest the latter conclusion, that is, that the
preceding rules describe the who and what for domestic service
and that 4(e) and (f) prescribe the modes of extraterritorial service
available. Rule 4(e) provides that
[w]henever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder
provides for a service of summons ... upon a party not an inhabitant of or
found within the state in which the district court is held, service may be
made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute
or order, or, if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of ser-
vice, in a manner stated in this rule."
In addition, 4(e) provides that
[w]henever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court
is held provides (1) for service of a summons ... upon a party not an in-
habitant of or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to
him to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason of the attach-
ment or garnishment or similar seizure of his property located within the
state, service may be made under the circumstances and in the manner pre-
scribed in the statute or rule.2
0
One might infer from the language of 4(e), as well as its heading,
that it, and not the preceding rules, is intended to govern extrater-
ritorial service. And 4(e) is complemented by 4(f), which provides
that
[aill process ... may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the
state in which the district court is held, and, when authorized by a statute
of the United States or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that
state."
That language, too, might imply that 4(e) and (f) are intended to
regulate extraterritorial service, and that the preceding rules gov-
ern domestic service only. To the extent that any consensus on the
point exists, it would seem to be one accepting those inferences.22
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(0.
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) & (2).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 694 F.2d 258, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1982):
Congress, of course, could authorize suits under federal law in any inferior federal
tribunal .... But where Congress has not done so, rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure normally confines the geographical area in which a district court's
process can be served to "the territorial limits of the state in which the district court
is held," . . . ; service outside the state is permitted only "when authorized by a
328 Vol. 23:323
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It seems to me, however, that there are two significant obstacles to
the acceptance of those inferences.
The first obstacle is the fact that 4(d)(7) (now repealed)2" had
long been used by federal courts as a basis for effecting extraterri-
torial service, notwithstanding the existence of 4(e) and (f). 4 That
usage of 4(d)(7) occurred during a time when 4(e) authorized out-
of-state service of a summons "[w]henever a statute of the United
States or an order of court" so provided,2" and 4(f) authorized ser-
vice of process "beyond the territorial limits of [the state in which
the district court is held]" 26 "when a statute of the United States
so provide[d]. 27 That would suggest that 4(e) and (f) had not been
intended to serve as the exclusive means of effecting extraterrito-
rial service; apparently, the preceding rules, when applicable, could
be used for that purpose. A similar conclusion as to recently en-
acted 4(c)(2)(C) is corroborated by the similarity of language be-
tween repealed 4(d)(7) and 4(c)(2)(C)(i). The former authorized
service on competent adults and other suable entities in the man-
ner prescribed by "the law of the state in which the district court
is held for the service of summons or other like process upon...
such defendant in an action brought in the courts of general juris-
diction of that state." 8 Precisely the same language appears in
4(c)(2)(C)(i). 5 Since former 4(d)(7) was available for effecting ex-
traterritorial service, as well as 4(e) and (f), current 4(c)(2)(C)(i)
would seem to be likewise available along with 4(e) and (f). More-
statute of the United States" or by some other specific provision of the Federal Rules
Id. See also Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1983):
When read in light of Rule 4(f), it is clear that Rule 4(d)(1) applies only when a
complaint is served within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court
where the action is pending sits . . . .Rule 4(e), which is reinforced by Rule 4(f),
requires that service be made "under the circumstances and in the manner pre-
scribed" by the law of the state in which the forum is located.
Id. See also F.T.C. v. Browning, 435 F.2d 96, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1970):
Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure normally limits the geographical
area where a district court's process can be served to the territorial limits of the state
in which the district court sits, except that extraterritorial service of process is proper
"when authorized by a statute of the United States."
Id.
23. FED. R. Ctv. P. 4(d)(7) (West 1960).
24. See, e.g., First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 735 (E.D.
Tenn. 1962); Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 767 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (West 1960).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (West 1960).
27. Id.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7) (West 1960).
29. See note 16 and accompanying text.
1985
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over, since 4(c)(2)(C) encompasses both subsections (i) and (ii),
joined by the disjunctive or,3" if (i) is available for extraterritorial
service, so too should (ii) be likewise available.31 It would be ex-
traordinarily awkward draftsmanship to have (i) so available and
(ii) not so available when the two subsections are separated only
by a disjunctive or. And the modes of service set forth in (ii)
would, in fact, be as efficient extraterritorially as domestically, and
as efficient extraterritorially as the mode set forth in (i).
The second obstacle exists in the language of 4(f) itself. As has
been demonstrated, 4(f) provides for service of process beyond the
territorial limits of the forum state "when authorized by a statute
of the United States or by these rules." That italicized language
strongly implies an intention to incorporate at least the totality of
Rule 4. That italicized language can hardly have been the product
of inadvertence. Since it did not exist in the earlier version of
4(f),12 it must have been added knowingly and purposefully. Ap-
parently, then, 4(e) and (f) are complementary to, and not in-
tended to exclude, the preceding sections of Rule 4 with regard to
service on a nonresident defendant.
The italicized portion of 4(f) generates another implication. Rule
4(e) authorizes extraterritorial service "[wihenever a statute of the
United States or an order of court thereunder [so] provides." In
those circumstances, "service may be made. . . in the manner pre-
scribed by statute or order, or, if there is no provision therein pre-
scribing the manner of service, in a manner stated in this rule."
That language seems to assert that a condition precedent to such
extraterritorial service is a federal statute so providing. Yet, 4(f)
provides for extraterritorial process "when authorized by a statute
of the United States or by these rules." This seems to indicate that
service beyond the limits of the forum state may be authorized by
either of two sources: a federal statute or the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. How should that apparent inconsistency between 4(e) and its
30. Id.
31. In Billy v. Ashland Oil Inc., No. 84-30 (W.D. Pa. filed June 13, 1984), a diversity
case, the court found that FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was available to effect service on a
nonresident defendant. It would seem, therefore, that a fortiori the Rule should be available
to effect service on a nonresident defendant in a federal cause of action. In Billy, the court
held that, where the nonresident did not return an acknowledgment of service, plaintiff was
required to effect personal service in one of the methods set forth in 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), see supra
note 16 and accompanying text, and could not resort, instead, to 4(c)(2)(C)(i). The court
noted, however, that "the clear intent of Rule 4 is that notice and acknowledgment shall be
returned." Billy at 1.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (West 1960).
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requirement of a jurisdictional statute and 4(f) and its disjunctive
requirements of jurisdictional statute or procedural rule be
reconciled?
The language of 4(e) does provide an alternative to an "ena-
bling" federal statute: "a statute or rule of court of the state in
which the district court is held." Thus, 4(e) requires, as a condition
precedent to extraterritorial service, either a federal "enabling"
statute or a state "enabling" statute or rule. Once that is recog-
nized, the apparent inconsistency between 4(e) and 4(f) tends to be
converted into a desire on the part of the drafters to achieve sym-
metry. If 4(e) may be satisfied by federal statute or state statute or
rule, 4(f) may be satisfied by federal statute or Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure. After all, why should 4(e) give greater jurisdic-
tional effect to a state statute or rule than 4(f) gives to federal
rules, with regard to the availability of extraterritorial service in a
federal court proceeding?
It could be argued, of course, that 4(e) authorizes the use of state
statute or rule only with regard to diversity cases, and there is
therefore a basis for denying a parallel effect with regard to 4(f)'s
authorization of the use of federal rules. There is, however, a seri-
ous problem with that argument. There is respectable authority for
the proposition that state long-arm statutes may be utilized to ef-
fect extraterritorial service in federal causes of action as well as in
diversity cases. s Consequently, 4(e)'s authorization of state law or
rule as the basis for service on a nonresident defendant should not
be read as limited to diversity cases. Reading 4(e) as authorizing
service pursuant to state law or rule in federal causes of action as
well as in diversity cases avoids the anomaly of having federal
courts hearing state-law claims enjoy a potentially greater jurisdic-
tional reach than federal courts hearing federal causes of action.
Avoiding that anomaly comports with an intuitive sense of propri-
ety. Clearly, the use of state law or rule in effecting service will
produce a mode of service which is, in fact, as efficient in federal
causes of action as it is in diversity cases. Ultimately, then, there is
an acceptable symmetry to 4(e) and (f). Each provides an alterna-
33. See, e.g., Fisons Limited v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241, 1249 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972) (civil antitrust action); Swanson Painting Co. v. Painters Local
Union No. 260, 391 F.2d 523, 524 (9th Cir. 1968) (Labor Management Relations Act suit);
United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919,
pet. for rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 982 (1966) (action to recover income taxes); Maney v.
Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760, 767 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (§ 1983 action); Engineered Sports Products
v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 724 (D. Utah 1973) (patent infringement suit).
1985
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 23:323
tive to an "enabling" federal statute as the condition precedent to
extraterritorial service; 4(e)'s alternative is a state statute or rule,
and 4(f)'s alternative is the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
But wait a minute. What about that conventional wisdom that
the jurisdictional reach of a federal court hearing a federal cause of
action can go no further than Congress provides? If 4(f) is read as
authorizing the use of the totality of Rule 4 in effecting extraterri-
torial service, won't the resulting jurisdictional reach far exceed
that granted by Congress? Not necessarily. After all, it was Con-
gress that authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate procedural
rules.34 And such rules as are promulgated by the Court become
effective only with the acquiescence of Congress, tacit where Con-
gress takes no further affirmative action, express where Congress
affirmatively asserts jurisdiction over proposed rules and, after
consideration (and perhaps change, as was the case with the most
34. See H.R. 7154, 97th Cong, 2d Sess. (1982):
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set forth the procedures to be followed in
civil actions and proceedings in United States district courts. These rules are usually
amended by a process established by 28 U.S.C. 2072, often referred to as the "Rules
Enabling Act." The Rules Enabling Act provides that the Supreme Court can propose
new rules of "practice and procedure" and amendments to existing rules by transmit-
ting them to Congress after the start of a regular session but not later than May 1.
The rules and amendments so proposed take effect 90 days after transmittal unless
legislation to the contrary is enacted.
On April 28, 1982, the Supreme Court transmitted to Congress several proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . . These amendments were
to have taken effect on August 1, 1982.
The amendments to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were intended
primarily to relieve United States marshals of the burden of serving summonses and
complaints in private civil actions. Appendix II, at 7 (Report of the Committee and
Rules of Practice and Procedure), 16 (Advisory Committee Note). The Committee
received numerous complaints that the changes not only failed to achieve that goal,
but that in the process the changes saddled litigators with flawed mail service, de-
prived litigants of the use of effective local procedures for service, and created a time
limit for service replete with ambiguities that could only be resolved by costly litiga-
tion. See House Report No. 97-662, at 2-4 (1982).
In order to consider these criticisms, Congress enacted Public Law 97-227, postpon-
ing the effective date of the proposed amendments to Rule 4 until October 1, 1983.
Accordingly, in order to help shape the policy behind, and the form of, the proposed
amendments, Congress must enact legislation before October 1, 1983.
With that deadline and purpose in mind, consultations were held with representa-
tive of the Judicial Conference, the Department of Justice, and others who had voiced
concern about the proposed amendments. H.R. 7154 is the product of those consulta-
tions. The bill seeks to effectuate the policy of relieving the Marshals Service of the
duty of routinely serving summonses and complaints. It provides a system of service
by mail modeled upon a system found to be effective in California, and finally, it
makes appropriate stylistic, grammatical, and other changes in Rule 4.
Id. Reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4437-38.
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recent amendments), enacts them.3 5 Therefore, whatever jurisdic-
tional significance may be attached to the federal rules is one in
which Congress has acquiesced, tacitly or expressly. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has said that "Congress could provide for service of
process anywhere in the United States . . . . Congress, having
omitted so to direct, the omission [in this case] was supplied by
Rule 4(f) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
3 6
Well, if that's the case, why does Congress ever bother to enact
an explicit jurisdictional statute? There may be a number of rea-
sons. First, many of the jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress
go to subject matter jurisdiction, rather than, or in addition to, the
existence vel non of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
37
Second, Congress, if dissatisfied with the jurisdictional reach af-
forded by the federal rules, could enact a statute extending or, con-
ceivably, restricting the jurisdictional reach provided by the rules.
Third, many of the so-called jurisdictional statutes enacted by
Congress may be as much as or more concerned with broadening
the venue which would otherwise be available under the general
venue statutes, than extending the jurisdictional reach available."
35. Id.
36. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1946).
37. On occasion, Congress may deal with subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdic-
tion, and venue in one statutory scheme, as it did with the Federal Interpleader Act:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action of interpleader
or in the nature of interpleader filed by any person. . . having in his. . . custody or
possession money or property of the value of $500 or more . . . if [tiwo or more ad-
verse claimants, of diverse citizenship. . . are claiming or may claim to be entitled to
such money or property. . . and if the plaintiff has deposited such money or prop-
erty . . . into the registry of the court ....
28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) & (2) (1976).
In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section
1335 of this title, a district court may issue its process for all claimants .. . .Such
process shall be. . .served by the United States marshals for the respective districts
where the claimants reside or may be found.
28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1976).
Any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335
of this title may be brought in the judicial district in which one or more of the claim-
ants reside.
28 U.S.C. § 1397 (1976).
38. See, e.g., Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1976); Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1976); patent infringement actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(f) (1976); Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(C) (1976); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976); Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77 v (a) (1976); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78aa (1976). At times, the distinction between venue and jurisdiction is a blurred one. In
Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619 (1925), the Court held that a congressional
enactment authorizing the Board to seek enforcement of a subpoena before "any United
States district court," id. at 620, went only to venue and not personal jurisdiction; conse-
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We know that, even assuming the existence of subject matter juris-
diction and jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the limi-
tations of general venue statutes3" may preclude the federal court
selected by the plaintiff from exercising jurisdiction. It is that kind
of limitation which often seems to preoccupy Congress in the en-
actment of "jurisdictional" statutes. The thrust of such statutes
seems to be one directed towards ameliorating the stringent limita-
tions of the general venue statutes.4"
Congress, itself, has evidenced that "parallelism" as between ju-
risdiction and venue. Given a defect in venue, Congress has au-
thorized the federal district courts to "dismiss, or if it be in the
interests of justice, transfer such case to any district . . . in which
it could have been brought. ' 41 More than twenty years ago, the
Supreme Court held' 2 that the statute authorized a federal district
court hearing a federal cause of action against "a number of defen-
dants,"'43 and finding that both venue and personal jurisdiction
were lacking as to two of the defendants, to transfer the action to
another federal district court where venue and jurisdiction did ex-
ist. In so ruling, the Court noted that
quently, a federal district court in Illinois could not enforce a subpoena served in Ohio. In
F.T.C. v. Browning, 435 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court held that a congressional enact-
ment authorizing the F.T.C. to seek enforcement of a subpoena before "[any of the district
courts of the United States within the jurisdiction of which [an F.T.C.] inquiry is carried
on," id. at 99, constituted a special grant of jurisdiction and not merely venue; consequently,
a federal district court in the District of Columbia could enforce a subpoena served by mail
in Pennsylvania. In United States v. Hill, 694 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the court held that
a congressional enactment authorizing the Department of Energy to seek enforcement of a
subpoena in "[a]ny of the district courts of the United States within the jurisdiction of
which [a DOE] inquiry is carried on," id. at 262, did "not confer on the District Court...
the power of extraterritorial service of process." Id. at 266. Consequently, the ;district court
in the District of Columbia could not enforce a subpoena served in Texas. That conclusion
in Hill led the court, after rehearing, to reverse the earlier order of the court, United States
v. Hill, 684 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (speaking order), which had affirmed the district
court's enforcement order. United States v. Hill, 525 F. Supp. 621 (D.D.C. 1981).
39. "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship
may be brought only in the federal district where all defendants reside, or in which the
claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976).
With regard to diversity jurisdiction, "[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded
solely on diversity of citizenship may, by law, be brought only in the judicial district where
all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)
(1976).
40. See supra note 36.
41. "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong
division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to
any district or division in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1976).
42. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
43. 369 U.S. at 464.
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[t]he language of § 1406(a) is amply broad enough to authorize the transfer
of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his case as to
venue, whether the court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction or
not. The section is thus in accord with the general purpose which has
prompted many of the procedural changes of the past few years-that of
removing whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly adju-
dication of cases and controversies on their merits."
More recently, Congress has provided that, given "a want of juris-
diction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer
such action . . . to any other such court in which the action...
could have been brought . . . . , The parallel language used in
the older venue statute and the more recent jurisdictional statute
is apparent. In addition to evidencing a somewhat parallel congres-
sional view of jurisdiction and venue, the newer statute seems to
evidence a recent congressional recognition that, even absent an
explicit or implicit grant of jurisdiction applicable in the original
court, no grave injustice is done the defendant by transferring the
action to a court where jurisdiction could have been achieved. That
benign recognition by Congress would seem to corroborate the con-
clusion suggested above that congressional authority would not be
seriously undermined by finding an implicit congressional approval
of the means of acquiring jurisdiction set forth in the Rules of Civil
Procedure. If transfer, rather than dismissal, is the congressionally
preferred reaction to "a want of jurisdiction," Congress is hardly
likely to be outraged by a judicial determination that the proce-
dural means of acquiring jurisdiction have been tacitly or expressly
approved by Congress.
Still, there is that judicial view that the Federal Rules of Civil
44. Id. at 466-67. In the event of a 1406(a) transfer of a diversity case, the substantive
law, including the conflicts law, of the state in which the transferee court sits is to be ap-
plied. Nelson v. International Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1983). Given a transfer
of a diversity case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) ("[flor the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice"), the substantive law, including the conflicts law, of the
state in which the transferor court sits is to be applied. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612
(1964). "In the [1404(a)] cases, we must apply the law of the transferor court to prevent
parties from seeking a change in venue to take advantage of more favorable laws in another
forum .... In [1406(a)] cases, however, it is necessary to look to the law of the transferee
state, also to prevent forum shopping, and to deny plaintiffs choice-of-law advantages to
which they would not have been entitled in the proper forum." Nelson v. International
Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643.
45. Federal Courts Improvement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (West Supp. 1983). For the full
text of the statute, see supra note 7. "For cases transferred for lack of jurisdiction in the
transferor court after October 1, 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 1631, provides that the action 'shall pro-
ceed as if it had been filed in . . . the court to which it is transferred ...... Nelson v.
International Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 n.3.
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Procedure exist, not to confer, but only to acquire, jurisdiction.
That view is perhaps most succinctly (and gracefully) stated in
Jim Fox Enterprises, Inc. v. Air France."8 There, Judge Brown
wrote that "our decision [leaves] undisturbed Judge Friendly's uni-
versally-adopted decision in Arrowsmith v. United Press Interna-
tional .. .which holds that Rule 4(d)(3) is a means, a procedural
method, for acquiring but not conferring jurisdiction."' 7 Isn't that
language at odds with our conclusion that personal jurisdiction
may be conferred by Rule 4? Perhaps not. Both Fox and Arrow-
smith s were diversity cases. In diversity cases, a sense of both the
proprieties of federalism and the more stringent jurisdictional re-
quirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, as compared with the fifth amendment,'9 suggests that the
jurisdictional reach available should be determined by state rather
than federal law. If the state imposes limitations on jurisdiction
more restrictive than the Constitution requires, a federal diversity
court ignoring those restrictions could be characterized as an "offi-
cious intermeddler." After all, in a state-law claim the state's deci-
sion as to the appropriate jurisdictional reach should be deemed
paramount; the diversity court, an alternative forum available only
because of the "accident" of diversity, should be deemed to have
no inherent interest in securing a longer jurisdictional reach. More-
over, the limitations imposed by state law may reflect that state's
view as to the constitutional restrictions required by the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause. Even an "overly cautious"
state view of those restrictions should not be ignored by a diversity
court, since such a course could generate a constitutional issue
which the state saw fit to avoid. But we are considering the juris-
dictional reach available to a federal court hearing a federal cause
of action. In those circumstances, the considerations of federalism
and the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment, so critical in a
diversity case, are simply irrelevant. The jurisdictional reach in-
tended by Congress is a federal, not a state, concern, and the con-
46. 705 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983).
47. Id. at 741.
48. Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963):
There thus exists an overwhelming consensus that the amenability of a foreign corpo-
ration to suit in a federal court in a diversity action is determined in accordance with
the law of the state where the court sits, with "federal law" entering the picture only
for the purpose of deciding whether a state's assertion of jurisdiction contravenes a
constitutional guarantee.
Id. at 223 (footnote omitted, italics added).
49. See infra text accompanying note 57.
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stitutional limitation on that reach is the due process clause of the
fifth, not the fourteenth, amendment. Consequently, I think the
cautionary language of Fox and Arrowsmith, perfectly appropriate
in diversity cases, is not applicable to this situation.
There is, however, DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc.50 There, one of
the questions noted by the Fifth Circuit was this: In a federal
cause of action where Rule 4(d)(7)'s authorization of the use of a
state long-arm statute to effect service is utilized, must Rule 4(e)'s
requirement that such service be permissible under state law be
satisfied? In attempting to resolve that narrow issue, the court
found that "[ujnfortunately we are faced with an embarrassment
of riches on this subject-our decisions are in conflict."51
The two most recent Fifth Circuit cases on this point, decided only three
days apart, give different answers. The second of these, [Lapeyrouse v. Tex-
aco, Inc.,] issued on December 17 [,1982], held that a federal standard
applies[.]
Three days before Lapeyrouse was decided, another panel of our court had
reached the opposite result in Burstein v. State Bar of California ....
That panel . . . [concluded] that "a federal court, even in a federal ques-
tion case, can use a state long-arm statute only to reach those parties whom
a court of the state could also reach under it.""2
Ultimately, DeMelo adopted the Burstein5 3 conclusion.
I have no serious quarrel with the court's preference for Burstein
over Lapeyrouse.5" I think it should be noted, however, that, as to
the defendant challenging in personam jurisdiction in DeMelo,
only diversity jurisdiction existed. 55 Therefore, the court's conclu-
sion may have been more dictum than decision. Still, my principal
reaction is that a federal court hearing a federal cause of action
today needn't concern itself with the narrow issue presented in
DeMelo and the intra-circuit inconsistency over that issue. I be-
lieve that, given the most recent amendments to the Federal Rules
50. 711 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 1264.
52. Id. at 1265-66.
53. Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982).
54. Lapeyrouse v. Texaco, Inc., 693 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1982). The conflict between
Burstein and Lapeyrouse and the DeMelo conclusion were noted and elaborated on in Han-
dley v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1269-70 (6th Cir. 1984).
55. "Because the basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction over Woolsey was not im-
mediately apparent from the pleadings, we noticed that issue sua sponte and conclude that
diversity jurisdiction is present .... Since the DeMelos did not attempt to cure this defect,
they cannot now rely on maritime jurisdiction." DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d
1260, 1262 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983).
1985
Duquesne Law Review
of Civil Procedure, it is possible that the plaintiff in a federal cause
of action may use any of the modes of service set forth in the total-
ity of Rule 4 to acquire jurisdiction over the nonresident defen-
dant, and, therefore, if the state long-arm statute would be un-
available because of state law, plaintiff can avoid the problem by
utilizing one of the other modes of service set forth in the Rule.
I believe that the recent jurisdictional statute enacted by Con-
gress and the most recent congressional amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure suggest that now may indeed be the
appropriate time for a judicial determination that Congress has ac-
quiesced in the use of any of the modes of service set forth in Rule
4 for conferring jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant and for
effecting extraterritorial service on that defendant in a federal
cause of action. Such a determination would enormously facilitate
the now difficult and complex task of defining the jurisdictional
reach available to a federal court hearing a federal cause of action
and would provide a resolution consistent with common sense and
logic. Consequently, I am impelled toward these conclusions: A
federal court hearing a federal cause of action may assert jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant in any manner provided by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the means of effecting
service set forth in Rule 4, as well as in any manner explicitly pro-
vided by congressional statute. The federal court may, of course,
be precluded from exercising that jurisdiction by venue limitations.
In such a case, the court, on defendant's motion, must transfer or
dismiss the action. Confronted with such a case, the court should
transfer, rather than dismiss, where transfer would be "in the in-
terest of justice," thus avoiding the delay and duplicative effort
and cost that otherwise would be imposed on the plaintiff.
Those conclusions confront us with the ultimate limitation on
the capacity of a federal court hearing a federal cause of action to
assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: due process.56 Be-
cause we are concerned with the jurisdictional reach of a federal
court hearing a federal cause of action, rather than that of a state
or diversity court hearing a state-law claim, the due process limita-
tion we must work with is that of the fifth, rather than the four-
teenth, amendment. "While the limitations imposed in the Fifth
Amendment are similar to those imposed upon the state court
under the Fourteenth Amendment, they are not necessarily identi-
56. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For the applicable text of the fifth amendment, see supra
note 5.
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cal."' 57 The "contours of amenability [to jurisdiction] are more
fluid"58 under the fifth, than under the fourteenth, amendment.
There are at least a couple of reasons for that greater fluidity, both
arising from the fact that a federal court hearing a federal cause of
action is acting as the judicial arm of the United States.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has utilized,5 9 interred, 60 dis-
interred,"' reburied e2  and resurrected 3  the "territorial sover-
57. Lapeyrouse v. Texaco, Inc., 693 F.2d 581, 585 (5th Cir. 1982).
58. Id. In Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1271 (6th Cir.
1984), the court noted "that a Fifth Amendment analysis of due process is different from
one undertaken under the Fourteenth Amendment. This is implicit in the Supreme Court's
treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment analysis in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 .... " In Hogue v. Milodon Engineering, Inc., 736 F.2d 989, 991 (4th Cir.
1984), the court noted:
The propriety of process issuing from federal courts sitting in cases arising under
federal law is not tested by the same yardstick as is the constitutional limitation upon
service of process issuing from state courts because the issues involved necessarily are
often national in character . . . . Rather, the defendant must look primarily to fed-
eral venue requirements for protection from onerous litigation.
Id.
59. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878) (citations omitted), the Court found
that the due process clause was intended to preserve
the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law . . . applicable
to them. One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . . The other prin-
ciple of public law . . . follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no State can
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons and property without its
territory.
Id.
60. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations omit-
ted), the Court seemed to lay to rest Pennoyer's concept of territorial sovereignty:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded
on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment per-
sonally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff . . . . But now that the capias ad
respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice,
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in per-
sonam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id.
61. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (citations omitted), the Court,
after recognizing that
[a]s technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the
need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same
time, progress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit
in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to these changes, the requirements
for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pen-
I noyer . . . to the flexible standard of International Shoe[,]
proceeded to effect an awkward wedding of territorial sovereignty with minimum contacts:
Those restrictions [on the personal jurisdiction of state courts] are more than a guar-
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eignty" function of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. As most recently enunciated by the Court in World-
Wide Volkswagen,64 that territorial sovereignty function exists
to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the
limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
system.
[T]he Framers ... intended that the States retain many essential attrib-
utes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try
causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limi-
tation on the sovereignty of all its sister States-a limitation express or im-
plicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment."'
antee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of
territorial limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal the
burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do
so unless he has the "minimum contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite to its
exercise of power over him. See International Shoe ....
Id.
62. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court said:
Thus, the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather
than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer
rest, [is] the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.
Nothing in Hanson v. Denckla ... is to the contrary. The Hanson Court's state-
ment that restrictions on state jurisdiction "are a consequence of territorial limita-
tions on the power of the respective states," . . . simply makes the point that the
States are defined by their geographical territory. After making this point, the Court
in Hanson determined that the defendant over which personal jurisdiction was
claimed had not committed any acts sufficiently connected to the State to justify
jurisdiction under the International Shoe standard.
Id. at 204 & n.20 (footnote and citations omitted).
63. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). See infra text
accompanying note 65.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 291-92, 293. Justice White, author of the Court's opinion in World-Wide
Volkswagen, subsequently cast doubt on the significance of the territorial sovereignty func-
tion of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie de Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982), Justice White, writing for the
Court, concluded that "[tihe personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an
individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of
sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty." Justice White also noted that:
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction, as ap-
plied to state courts, reflects an element of federalism and the character of state sov-
ereignty vis-a-vis other states . . . . World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty inter-
est protected by the Due Process Clause. That clause is the only source of the per-
sonal jurisdiction requirement and the clause itself makes no mention of federalism
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Rather clearly, the territorial sovereignty function has no role to
play with regard to the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
A federal court hearing a federal cause of action has no "coequal
sovereigns." It is the exclusive forum provided for the cause of ac-
tion asserted.6 6 Consequently, while the "sovereignty of each State
• . . [may] impl[y] a limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister
States," the implication is simply irrelevant to the court represent-
ing the federal sovereignty.7
The second reason for that greater fluidity, like the first, grows
out of the broader territorial sovereignty of the federal govern-
ment. That broader territorial sovereignty implies a broader appli-
cation of International Shoe'sas minimum contacts test, and, as
well, a broader application of the other tests suggested by Interna-
tional Shoe.
International Shoe suggests that the relationship between non-
resident defendant and forum state may fall within one of three
categories. First, nonresident defendant may have only occasional,
isolated contacts with the forum state.69 Second, nonresident de-
fendant may conduct systematic, relatively continuous activities
within the forum state.70 And, finally, nonresident defendant may
have a pervasive presence within the forum state.71 International
Shoe teaches that, where the first situation obtains, that is, where
nonresident defendant has only minimum contacts with the forum,
concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an independent restric-
tion on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the per-
sonal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions cannot change the power of sover-
eignty, although the individual can subject himself to powers from which he may
otherwise be protected.
Id. at 702-03 n.10.
For a more elaborate treatment of the peculiar course of the territorial sovereignty func-
tion of the due process clause in Court opinions, and a personal explanation for that course,
see Seidelson, Recasting World-Wide Volkswagen as a Source of Larger Jurisdictional
Reach, 19 TULSA L.J. 1, 5 (1983).
66. The Federal Employers' Liability Act is an exception to that rule, since the act
provides for concurrent state or federal court jurisdiction. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1972).
67. Obviously the second of these functions [limiting the jurisdiction of coequal
sovereigns] applies only to actions in state courts and diversity actions in federal
courts. When a federal court is hearing and deciding a federal question case there are
no problems of "coequal sovereigns." That is a Fourteenth Amendment concern
which is not present in actions founded on federal substantive Law.
Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1271 (6th Cir. 1984).
68. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
69. Id. at 316, 319.
70. Id. at 317.
71. Id. at 318. The classic example of such a pervasive presence may be found in Per-
kins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
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due process requires that the cause of action asserted arise out of
those minimum contacts.72 At the other extreme, where nonresi-
dent defendant has a pervasive presence within the forum state,
due process permits the court to assert jurisdiction over the defen-
dant as to any cause of action, whether or not it arises out of de-
fendant's in-forum activities. 73 But what about the middle cate-
gory? Where nonresident defendant has significant contacts with
the forum-contacts greater than minimal but less than a perva-
sive presence-in what circumstances may the forum assert juris-
diction over the defendant?
It has been stated that "where the [nonresident's] in-state activ-
ity was 'continuous and systematic' and that activity gave rise to
the episode in suit, personal jurisdiction unquestionably could be
asserted. . . .International Shoe itself ranked in that category." 4
That language indicates, quite correctly I believe, that significant
contacts between nonresident defendant and forum state consti-
tuted simply an a fortiori instance of the minimum contacts test
attributed to International Shoe: In either instance, the cause of
action asserted had to arise out of those contacts.
More recently, however, in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court
concluded that
[t]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is
that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such
that he should reasonably anticipate being hailed into court there ....
The Due Process Clause ...gives a degree of predictability to the legal
system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct
with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not
render them liable to suit.7"
With that language, the Court apparently concluded that a princi-
pal role of the due process clause was to protect nonresident defen-
dants from jurisdictional surprise. That function of the due process
clause has unique applicability to those situations in which nonres-
ident has significant contacts with the forum. If such significant
contacts exist as a result of defendant's "primary conduct," and
such significant contacts make actions of a particular kind in the
forum reasonably foreseeable, subjecting the defendant to jurisdic-
72. 326 U.S. at 319.
73. Id. at 318.
74. Donahue v. Far Eastern Air Transport Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(emphasis in original).
75. 444 U.S. at 297.
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tion in the forum with regard to actions of that kind would hardly
come as a jurisdictional surprise, whether or not the specific action
arose out of defendant's contacts with the forum.7 6 Consequently,
76. For an elaboration of that conclusion, see Seidelson, supra note 65, at 4.
I believe that corroboration for that significant contacts test may be found in Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984). Plaintiff, a New York resident, brought a
libel action against defendant, an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in
California, in the federal court sitting in New Hampshire and exercising diversity jurisdic-
tion. The New Hampshire long-arm statute authorized jurisdiction over foreign corporations
"to the fullest extent permitted under [the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
to] the federal constitution." Id. at 1478 n.4. Plaintiff selected the New Hampshire forum
because of that state's six-year statute of limitations, making "New Hampshire... the only
State where [the] suit would not have been time-barred when it was filed." Id. at 1477.
Finding that the defendant's "contacts with New Hampshire consist of the sale of some 10
to 15,000 copies of Hustler magazine in that State each month," the Court concluded that
the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant was not precluded by the due process clause.
That assertion of jurisdiction was constitutionally permissible even though "[iut [was] un-
doubtedly true that the bulk of the harm done to [plaintiff] occurred outside New Hamp-
shire." Id. at 1481. Those circumstances suggest that (1) nonresident defendant's contacts
with the forum state were not merely "random, isolated, or fortuitous," id. at 1478; rather,
(2) those contacts were "continuous and systematic"; therefore, (3) while defendant's "activ-
ities in the forum may not be so substantial as to support jurisdiction over a cause of action
unrelated to those activities," id. at 1481, (4) they were "sufficient to support jurisdiction
when the cause of action arises out of the very activity being conducted, in part, in New
Hampshire." Id. That suggests to me that, since defendant had generated significant con-
tacts with the forum state, making libel actions against it in that state foreseeable, it would
come as no jurisdictional surprise to the defendant to subject it to jurisdiction in the forum
in this particular action, even though "the bulk of the harm done to [plaintiff] occurred
outside New Hampshire." Id.
In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984), the Court found
that the assertion of jurisdiction by a Texas state court over the Colombian defendant vio-
lated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Blackmun, writing for
the Court, read the record as indicating that "[a]ll parties to the present case concede that
[plaintiffs'] claims against [defendant] did not 'arise out of' and are not related to [defen-
dant's] activities within Texas." Id. at 1872-73 (footnote omitted). That conclusion made it
unnecessary for the majority to consider what "relationship between the cause of action and
the [defendant's] contacts with the State of Texas" would have justified the assertion of
jurisdiction. Id. at 1873 n.10. Justice Brennan, dissenting, read the record as negating any
concession by the plaintiff "that their claims are not related to [defendant's] activities
within the State of Texas." Id. at 1877 n.3. Justice Brennan, therefore, considered the "dis-
tinction between contacts that are 'related to' the underlying cause of action and contacts
that 'give rise' to the underlying cause of action." Id. at 1878. He concluded that "there is a
substantial difference between these two standards for asserting specific jurisdiction. Thus,
although I agree that the [plaintiffs'] cause of action did not formally 'arise out of' specific
activities initiated by [defendant] in the State of Texas, I believe that the wrongful death
claim filed by the [plaintiffs] is significantly related to the undisputed contacts between
[defendant] and the forum. On that basis, I would conclude that the Due Process Clause
allows the Texas Courts to assert specific jurisdiction over this particular action." Id.
The defendant in Hall had negotiated a contract with a Texas consortium under the
terms of which the defendant was to transport by helicopter personnel and equipment to an
oil pipeline construction site in Peru. During such a flight, one of the defendant's helicopters
crashed in Peru, causing the deaths of four employees of the consortium. Neither the dece-
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World Wide Volkswagen would seem to create a jurisdictional dis-
tinction between minimum contacts and significant contacts. With
the former, the cause of action asserted must arise out of nonresi-
dent defendant's contacts with the forum; with the latter, the
cause of action need only be of the type made foreseeable by non-
resident defendant's significant contacts with the forum. Thus, the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment operates differ-
ently in each of three categories. When nonresident defendant has
only minimum contacts with the forum, due process requires that
the cause of action arise out of those minimum contacts. When
nonresident defendant has significant contacts with the forum, due
process requires only that the cause of action asserted be of the
type made foreseeable by those significant contacts. Where nonres-
ident defendant has a pervasive presence within the forum, due
process permits jurisdiction over the defendant as to any cause of
action.
Now we must attempt to determine how those fourteenth
amendment due process tests convert with regard to the fifth
amendment. Here, by hypothesis, we are considering a federal
court hearing a federal cause of action. In those circumstances,
how should "the forum state" be read for due process purposes? I
think the appropriate answer is "the United States."'7 After all,
the sovereignty represented by the court is the United States. And
dents nor their personal representatives were Texas domiciliaries, although all were United
States citizens. In those circumstances, I would be inclined to conclude that the wrongful
death actions had arisen out of defendant's forum activities; after all, the defendant's alleg-
edly negligent performance arose out of the contract it had negotiated in Texas. Short of
that, however, bearing in mind that the victims and their representatives were not Texas
domiciliaries, I would be inclined to conclude that the defendant's having negotiated the
contract in Texas made such causes of action against it in Texas foreseeable; therefore, the
wrongful death actions in Texas should have come as no jurisdictional surprise to the defen-
dant, notwithstanding the fact that the decedents had been domiciled in states other than
Texas.
77. Cf. First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 736 (E.D.
Tenn. 1962) (implying that jurisdiction in federal court is constitutionally permissible if
defendant has minimum contacts with United States). In Weinberg v. Colonial Williams-
burg, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 633, 638 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), the court said:
A recent district court decision of interest has suggested that the minimum contacts
required by International Shoe need only be with the United States as a whole in
actions brought in the federal Courts. First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Co....
Counsel have not argued this point to the court and that decision is in no way bind-
ing upon this court. Were the court to consider that argument however it would reject
it as erroneous.
Id. It should be noted that Weinberg was in federal court on diversity grounds; in First
Flight, the plaintiff had asserted a federal cause of action. The jurisdictional reach consid-
ered in this text is that which exists in a federal court hearing a federal cause of action.
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the cause of action asserted is one created by the Congress of the
United States. If forum state is translated into United States, how
will the due process tests read? Well, something like this: If defen-
dant has only minimum contacts with the United States, due pro-
cess requires that the federal cause of action asserted arise out of
those minimum contacts. If defendant has significant contacts with
the United States, due process requires only that the federal cause
of action asserted be of the type made foreseeable by those signifi-
cant contacts. And where defendant has a pervasive presence
within the United States, due process permits jurisdiction over the
defendant as to any federal cause of action.
Is there any problem with thus transcribing the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment into the due process clause of
the fifth? It could be said that such a transcription might require a
State A defendant to defend a federal cause of action in a federal
district court sitting in distant State B when the operative facts
had occurred in State C. But there are a few appropriate responses
to that concern. This is a question of jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. Such jurisdiction may be found to exist and yet be "unex-
ercisable" if venue is inappropriate. Given the limitations of venue
available to hear a federal cause of action, already noted, the likeli-
hood of undue imposition on the defendant is diminished substan-
tially. Beyond restrictions on venue, there is a 1404(a)7 a motion to
transfer. Should defendant find himself unduly disadvantaged by
litigation in the federal district court selected by plaintiff, defen-
dant may seek transfer to any district court where the action could
have been brought. The limitations on venue complemented by the
availability of a 1404(a) motion to transfer should adequately ame-
liorate any concern over undue imposition on the defendant. 79
An additional factor should be noted in the transcription from
the fourteenth to the fifth amendment due process clause. In the
traditional fourteenth amendment situation, the concern is di-
rected toward a nonresident defendant. In the vast majority of
fifth amendment cases, the defendant will be a resident of the sov-
ereignty represented by the federal court and of the sovereignty
78. The United States Code provides that "[flor the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1972).
79. In Hogue v. Milodon Engineering, Inc., 736 F.2d 989, 991 (4th Cir. 1984), the
court, referring to the nonresident defendant in a federal cause of action, noted that "the




which created the federal cause of action, the United States. In
those cases, it really isn't accurate to characterize the defendant as
a nonresident for due process purposes. He may or may not reside
within the judicial district of the federal court or of the state in
which the federal court sits, but he remains a resident of the
United States. He may or may not have acted within the judicial
district of the federal court or the state in which the federal court
sits, but he did act within the United States. He may or may not
have been served within the judicial district of the federal court or
the state in which the court sits, but he almost certainly will have
been served within the United States. Where he resides within the
United States and where he acted within the United States would
seem to go more appropriately to the existence of venue or the pro-
priety of a 1404(a) transfer than to the constitutional capacity of
the federal court hearing the federal cause of action to assert juris-
diction over the United States resident. Where he was served
would seem to lack constitutional significance so long as the mode
of service utilized was one reasonably calculated to give the defen-
dant actual notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to de-
fend.80 Any mode of service specifically authorized by Congress or
provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the
totality of Rule 4, would seem virtually certain to satisfy those
requirements.
These, then, are my ultimate conclusions. A federal court hear-
ing a federal cause of action may acquire jurisdiction over the de-
fendant in any manner explicitly provided for in a congressional
statute or in any manner provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, including all of Rule 4, implicitly approved by Con-
gress. That conclusion would be simultaneously consistent with a
logical sense of symmetry and the most recent congressional enact-
ments dealing with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and juris-
diction. In the event of a defect in venue or "a want of jurisdic-
tion," the federal court selected by the plaintiff should, if in the
interest of justice, transfer the action to any federal court in which
venue and jurisdiction would be appropriate. In such circum-
stances, the due process clause of the fifth amendment would not
80. "[The] adequacy [of substituted service] so far as due process is concerned is de-
pendent on whether or not the form of substituted service provided for such cases and em-.
ployed is reasonably calculated to give. . . actual notice of the proceedings and an opportu-
nity to be heard." Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). I assume that that test for
the adequacy of notice would be the same under the fifth amendment as under the
fourteenth.
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preclude the exercise of such jurisdiction so long as (1) the defen-
dant had minimum contacts with the United States and the fed-
eral cause of action arose out of those contacts, or (2) the defen-
dant had generated significant contacts with the United States and
the federal cause of action was of the type foreseeable as a result of
those contacts, whether or not the particular cause of action arose
out of those contacts, or (3) the defendant had a pervasive pres-
ence within the United States. That application of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment would provide ample assurance that
a defendant in a federal cause of action would not be deprived of
property without due process of law, would afford appropriate sen-
sitivity to the federal interest inherent in a federal cause of action,
and would complement the most recent congressional enactments
dealing with extraterritorial jurisdiction. It would, as well, facili-
tate charting a rational path through what has been a jurisdic-
tional maze.

